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SUMMARY
We consider the problem of designing enterprise network security systems
which are easy to manage, robust and flexible. This problem is challenging. Today,
most approaches rely on host security, middleboxes, and complex interactions between
many protocols. To solve this problem, we explore how new programmable network-
ing paradigms can facilitate fine-grained network control. We present Resonance, a
system for securing enterprise networks , where the network elements themselves en-
force dynamic access control policies through state changes based on both flow-level
information and real-time alerts. Resonance uses programmable switches to manip-
ulate traffic at lower layers; these switches take actions (e.g., dropping or redirecting
traffic) to enforce high-level security policies based on input from both higher-level se-
curity boxes and distributed monitoring and inference systems. Using our approach,
administrators can create security applications by first identifying a state machine to
represent different policy changes and then, translating these states into actual net-
work policies. Earlier approaches in this direction (e.g., Ethane, Sane) have remained
low-level requiring policies to be written in languages which are too detailed and are
difficult for regular users and administrators to comprehend. As a result, significant
effort is needed to package policies, events and network devices into a high-level ap-
plication. Resonance abstracts out all the details through its state-machine based
policy specification framework and presents security functions which are close to the
end system and hence, more tractable.
To demonstrate how well Resonance can be applied to existing systems, we con-
sider two use cases. First relates to “Network Admission Control” problem. Georgia
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Tech dormitories currently use a system called START (Scanning Technology for Au-
tomated Registration, Repair, and Response Tasks) to authenticate and secure new
hosts entering the network [23]. START uses a VLAN-based approach to isolate new
hosts from authenticated hosts, along with a series of network device interactions.
VLANs are notoriously difficult to use, requiring much hand-holding and manual
configuration. Our interactions with the dorm network administrators have revealed
that this existing system is not only difficult to manage and scale but also inflexible,
allowing only coarse-grained access control. We implemented START by expressing
its functions in the Resonance framework. The current system is deployed across
three buildings in Georgia Tech with both wired as well as wireless connectivities.
We present an evaluation of our system’s scalability and performance. We consider
dynamic rate limiting as the second use case for Resonance. We show how a network
policy that relies on rate limiting and traffic shaping can easily be implemented using
only a few state transitions. We plan to expand our deployment to more users and
buildings and support more complex policies as an extension to our ongoing work.
Main contributions of this thesis include design and implementation of a flexible
access control model, evaluation studies of our system’s scalability and performance,
and a campus-wide testbed setup with a working version of Resonance running. Our
preliminary evaluations suggest that Resonance is scalable and can be potentially
deployed in production networks. Our work can provide a good platform for more




We present a dynamic and flexible access control system which is capable of support-
ing diverse and complex network policies. With increasingly many diverse network
hosts and devices, network management and security has become challenging and
error-prone [15]. All the state-of-the-art techniques require manual intervention and
are inflexible and coarse-grained. To solve this problem, we incorporate and evaluate a
centralized state-machine based model, Resonance [18], which leverages programma-
bility in today’s switches to tackle these problems. Resonance is currently functional
on a research testbed across a subset of buildings in the Georgia Tech campus and
we plan to replace the current access control technology with our system.
1.1 Motivation
Enterprise networks comprise of various network elements and host many hetero-
geneous and potentially untrusted devices. Even with significant advances in host
security, the growing number and types of these devices pose a significant burden on
network administrators to be continually aware of these devices and to be able to
detect and isolate potential security threats. These devices run a variety of operating
systems and have different softwares bringing with them a diverse set of vulnerabil-
ities. Large-scale network attacks such as botnets or DoS present another layer of
security breach on top of host-level threats. In fact, network-level compromises can
be more lethal than most host-level threats as these spread much faster and can po-
tentially bring down an entire network if unchecked. In the face of these challenges, it
becomes imperative to be able to monitor the entire network continually and identify
and isolate various network threats as early as possible.
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Today, network administrators resort to many different ad-hoc techniques to safe-
guard hosts from attacks. A variety of devices are deployed to cater to specific secu-
rity aspects of the network. To name a few, there are firewalls, security middle-boxes,
VLANs, captive portals, Radius servers, VMPS, etc. There are several different
ways of just implementing a simple captive portal authentication system, ranging
from DNS-based redirection to VLAN-based host isolation. These techniques are too
static, unscalable, and rigid; moreover, none of the existing techniques address the
issue of continuous monitoring of the entire network and isolation of these machines
on the fly. As an instance, DNS-based redirection techniques often involve setting
timers to re-enable normal DNS after successful authentication. Any change in timer
values or late authentication response can cause the system to behave erroneously.
In addition, most of the threat identifications and removal is done manually, often
resulting in human errors.
1.2 Resonance: Flexible Access Control for Campus and
Enterprise Networks
Instead of placing trust in the end hosts or relying on security middleboxes, an enter-
prise network should offer mechanisms that directly control network traffic according
to dynamic, fine-grained security policies, and in response to input from distributed
network monitors. Extending the metaphor of a network operating system [13] to the
design of secure networks, we present the design of Resonance, which provides mecha-
nisms for directly implementing dynamic network security policies in the network, at
devices and switches, leaving little responsibility to either the hosts or higher layers of
the network. We draw inspiration from the design of secure operating systems, where
complex system components are built using small, hardened, trusted components as a
base. Similarly, Resonance imbues the network layer with the basic functions needed
to implement security policies, as well as a control interface that allows monitoring
systems to control traffic according to predefined policies.
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As in previous work (e.g., Ethane [3]), Resonance controls traffic using policies
that a controller installs in programmable switches [20, 5]. Extending this paradigm,
we create a dynamic access control framework that integrates the controller with mon-
itoring subsystems. This integration allows an operator to specify how the network
should control traffic on an enterprise as network conditions change. For example,
Resonance can automatically quarantine hosts or subsets of traffic when a compromise
or other security breach is detected.
Recent trends enable integration of dynamic monitoring and control. First, pro-
grammable (and software-based) network devices [20, 5] allow more direct, fine-grained
control over network traffic. At first blush, programmable network devices might seem
to present yet another source of complexity, but we believe that this programmability
actually presents an opportunity to proactively secure the network layer. Second,
distributed network monitoring algorithms can now quickly and accurately correlate
traffic from many distinct (and often distributed) sources to detect coordinated at-
tacks (e.g., for detecting botnets [12] and spammers [21]). Finally, the trend towards
logically centralized network control [11, 8] allows us to more easily integrate dis-
tributed network monitoring with dynamic network control.
Resonance’s design follows a state-machine model. A network system can be
represented using a state machine abstraction. A state machine is defined in terms of
a set of states and their transitions based on inputs from the network. In the context
of network access control, each state represents a set of policies stating which network
services are allowed in that state and which are not. The definition of a state can
be made more general by extending it to not only include network services but also
rate limiting and other network parameters. For example, hosts belonging to certain
states are only allowed to send traffic at a particular rate. This flexibility makes this
state machine model a powerful tool to control the network. Several enhancements
and state machine variations can be incorporated into the model.
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1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we demonstrate a flexible and dynamic network access control model,
present our implementation and deployment experiences at Georgia Tech campus
testbed, show our initial evaluation results, and analyze two different use cases where
our system can be applied. As far as we know, Resonance is the first system that
allows dynamic, fine-grained network policies based on integration with monitoring
systems. We explore how Resonance not only simplifies the implementation of net-
work security policies but also enables fine-grained security policies and a wide range
of features. Our evaluation studies suggest that Resonance can scale well with a good
performance. Our campus-wide testbed itself presents a great platform for setting up
and evaluating new protocols and research ideas concurrently. We believe that our




BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Background
We describe the network access control problem in the context of the Georgia Tech
campus network. We also introduce OpenFlow [20], an interface for programmable
switches that serves as the basis for our implementation. Then, we discuss NOX, an
OpenFlow controller framework for writing applications for OpenFlow. Finally, we
present an overview of prior work and their relevance to our work.
2.1.1 Access Control and Monitoring
Campus and enterprise networks are often large, heterogeneous, and difficult to man-
age, owing to network size, lack of good troubleshooting infrastructure and manual
configuration. As such, network administration can be troublesome, manual, and
error-prone. Network administrators often encounter situations where machines are
infected or compromised. Today, the network operator must manually remove or
quarantine the machine from the network, which is tedious. The network should offer
flexible control over network traffic and also scale to a large number of users and
traffic flows. To the extent possible, network management should also be automated.
2.1.2 Overview of Existing System
Figure 1 shows the current START architecture [23], the authentication system de-
ployed on the Georgia Tech campus. It is currently based on virtual LANs (VLANs)
and VLAN Management Policy Server (VMPS) [26]. The START system supports
the following functions:
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Figure 1: Current START Architecture.
Registration. The registration system provides the Web interface to the backend
registration database, DHCP, DNS, authentication, and updates for external systems.
The Web interface guides users through the registration process. The DNS server
returns the IP address for the registration server for all DNS queries except for a list
of domains needed for patching (e.g., windowsupdate.com). The system runs two
DHCP servers: One for the unregistered VLAN, and one for the registered VLAN.
Each instance has its own configuration files that are created automatically from data
in the registration system’s database.
Scanning. During the registration process, the scanner device performs a host scan
to detect any known vulnerabilities. If the scan reveals vulnerabilities, the user is
presented with these vulnerabilities and asked to update the system. The firewall
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allows traffic to the appropriate update servers.
Firewall. The registration VLAN uses a firewall to block network traffic to un-
registered hosts. The firewall allows Web and secure Web (i.e., port 80 and 443)
traffic to pass so that hosts can reach update sites. The local switches determine the
VLAN for each machine that joins the network. The switch will download VLAN
maps periodically from a VMPS. Unknown MAC addresses are assigned to the un-
registered VLAN and known MAC addresses are placed onto the appropriate subnet.
VMPS periodically downloads the VLAN maps from the registration server. Security
is enforced with ARP tables that map each MAC address to its registered IP address.
Several other mechanisms exist which try to solve the problem of network admis-
sion control. DNS-based solutions are common. The hosts are temporarily forwarded
to the web-portal using DNS-based redirection. After authentication, the firewall
waits for a timeout value before sending the correct DNS entry. This DNS poison-
ing technique may negatively affect post-authenticated internet use when the client
machine references non-authentic data in its local resolver cache. Another approach
could be to use normal switches and write a script to modify forwarding tables.
Though this somewhat achieves the same effect as the OpenFlow protocol, yet there
are some serious drawbacks with this approach. Since the method for manipulat-
ing the forwarding tables is not standard, different switches would require different
scripts. Moreover, this approach is not very clean, as the scripts may not work with
new switch firmwares which are not backward compatible. VLAN-based techniques
offer more promise since hosts can be mapped to different VLANs which have different
policies. In the next subsection, we focus mainly on the problems faced by START
and VLAN-based architectures.
2.1.3 Problems with the current design
The current architecture has several shortcomings:
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1. Access control is too coarse-grained. START deploys two different VLANs
to separate infected or compromised machines from healthy machines. This
segregation results in all compromised hosts residing on a single VLAN; such a
configuration does not provide proper isolation, since these infected hosts are
not isolated from each other. Additionally, relying on VLANs makes the system
inflexible and less configurable, because VLANs typically map hosts to network
segments according to MAC address, not according to individual flows.
2. Hosts cannot be dynamically remapped to different portions of the
network. In the current configuration, when a machine is mapped to a different
part of the network, it must be rebooted to ensure that it receives a public IP
address, which is inconvenient because it relies on user intervention.
3. Monitoring is not continuous. Authentication and scanning only occur
when a network device is initially introduced; if the device is subsequently
compromised (or otherwise becomes the source of unwanted traffic), it cannot
be dynamically remapped to the gardenwalled portion of the network.
Many of the current shortcomings result from the fact that security functions have
been added to the existing network infrastructure after the fact. This design was
natural when switches needed to be treated as “black boxes”; however, switch ven-
dors have begun to expose a standard interface, OpenFlow [20], whereby an external
controller can affect how a switch forwards traffic. We summarize OpenFlow below.
2.2 OpenFlow
OpenFlow-enabled switches expose an open protocol for programming the forwarding
tables, also referred to as flow tables, and taking actions based on entries in these
flow tables. The basic architecture consists of a switch, a centralized controller, and
end hosts. The switch and the controller communicate over a secure channel using
the OpenFlow control protocol [20], which can affect flow table entries on the switch.
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Table 1: The header fields that an OpenFlow switch can map.
In Port VLAN ID
Ethernet IP TCP
SA DA Type SA DA Proto Src Dst
The OpenFlow protocol provides flow-level granularity for manipulating network
traffic. A flow is defined as a 10-tuple including Ethernet, IP, VLAN headers as shown
in Table 1. OpenFlow switches have three salient features: (1) A Flow Table, with
an action associated with each flow entry, to tell the switch how to process the flow,
(2) A Secure Channel that connects the switch to a remote control process (called
the controller), allowing commands and packets to be sent between a controller and
the switch using (3) The OpenFlow Protocol, which provides an open and standard
way for a controller to communicate with a switch. When a new flow arrives at the
switch, it forwards the first packet to the controller. The controller then sends an
OpenFlow command to instruct the switch to install an entry in its flow table with
an associated action to be taken when encountering future packets belonging to the
same flow. Currently, all OpenFlow switches support three actions:
1. Forward this flow’s packets to a given port or ports. This function allows
packets to be forwarded.
2. Encapsulate and forward this flow’s packets to a controller. In this case, the
packet is delivered to a secure channel, where it is encapsulated and sent to
a controller. This function may be used for the first packet in a flow, so a
controller can decide if the flow should be added to the flow table.
3. Drop this flow’s packets.
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Figure 2: OpenFlow-enabled Switch. The Flow Table is programmed by a controller
over the Secure Channel.
2.3 NOX: A controller framework
OpenFlow provides a platform for users to write their own controllers to control traf-
fic through the switches. NOX [13] is a software platform that allows users to write
their own custom controller components for OpenFlow. Figure 3 shows the NOX
architecture. Components are essentially distinct controller instances on a single
network view. NOX’s network view includes the switch-level topology including all
the network elements, users, hosts etc., along with network services. Programmati-
cally, NOX applications are just a set of event handlers which are invoked whenever
corresponding events are raised. Thus, the NOX framework serves as middleware
between the OpenFlow switches and controller components. Primary components of
a NOX-based network include a set of switches and one or more network-attached
servers. NOX controls traffic at a per-flow granularity. In other words, once control
is exerted on some packet, subsequent packets with the same header are treated in
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Figure 3: Components of a NOX-based network: OpenFlow (OF) switches and a
server PC running NOX with different components. Communication among compo-
nents and NOX happens using events and message passing.
the same way. To control the switches, NOX uses the OpenFlow protocol and in-
stalls flow-table entries on the appropriate switches as advised by the top-layer NOX
components. The following subsection explains some of the programmatic interfaces
available in NOX to create applications.
2.3.1 Programmatic Interface
NOX’s programmatic interface revolves around events, a namespace, and the network
view.
Events. To cope with changes in network events, NOX applications can register a
set of handlers to execute when a particular event happens. Execution of these event
handlers happen in the order of their priority. Events can be generated by OpenFlow
switches themselves. Some of these include switch join, switch leave, packet received,
switch statistics received, etc. Applications can also receive messages generated inter-
nally by NOX applications through the post() API while processing other messages.
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We use this message-passing interface in Resonance for communication between main
Resonance component and helper components.
Control. Management applications exert network control through the OpenFlow
control protocol. The OpenFlow abstraction enables users applications to manipulate
forwarding tables on switches. Applications can insert entries, delete entries, or read
counters from entries in the flow table.
Network View and Namespace. NOX software comes pre-installed with a
number of “base” applications that construct the network view and maintain a high-
level namespace that can be used by other applications. These applications provide
a mapping between high-level names and their bindings in the network view. Thus,
application creators need only operate in high-level namespaces, not with low-level
network bindings.
Higher-Level Services. NOX includes a set of system libraries to facilitate
efficient implementations of common functions such as standard network services
including DHCP and DNS.
We have chosen NOX as the base for our implementation. The flexibility and
infrastructure offered by NOX made us choose it instead of developing our own custom
controller from scratch. Moreover, NOX currently has a community of developers who
are willing to provide support and debug issues. However, dealing with such a nascent
piece of software does come with its drawbacks too. NOX lacks in documentation
and most of the source of information comes through the source code itself and the
NOX mailing list, but development is straightforward after the initial learning curve.
2.4 Related Work
The concept of dynamic, flexible access control goes back to task-based and Petri
Net workflow-based methods [24], [17]. But, most of this work does not involve real
system implementation or deployment. We have not seen any of these models applied
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to network access control. Resonance is the first work of its kind with a design and
implementation of a network access control model using programmable switches.
Resonance draws inspiration from 4D [11] and Ethane [3], both of which advocate
controlling network switches from a separate, logically centralized system. Ethane [3]
is perhaps the most closely related work to Resonance. Like Ethane, Resonance relies
on a centralized controller. However, Ethane does not support continuous monitoring
and inference-based policy control. Ethane focuses primarily on host authentication,
as opposed to security-related problems such as monitoring and containment. Reso-
nance extends the Ethane paradigm by exploring how dynamic security policies and
actions (e.g., actions based on alerts from distributed detection systems) could be
more directly integrated into the network fabric.
As discussed in previous section, our implementation is based on the NOX con-
troller framework. Recently, several NOX-based controllers have emerged. SNAC
[22], is one such controller which provides a web interface to NOX to specify policies.
SNAC is based on FSL [14], a policy language for NOX that allows network opera-
tors to write and maintain policies efficiently. Resonance focuses more on creating the
actual policies that relate to dynamic access control and monitoring in enterprise net-
works. SNAC also provides an option to setup a web authentication portal. However,
the portal is primitive and provides only basic authentication. There is no capability
to dynamically change policies based on network inputs.
Resonance allows network devices to operate on the granularity of flows using
the OpenFlow standard [20] and has origins in the designs of earlier protocols (e.g.,
ATM [19]) and programmable switch architectures [25]. Recent trends in packet
forwarding architectures (e.g., [4]) have tried to achieve a similar shift towards the
lower layers by having the software part of the switch make forwarding and pass it
on to the hardware.
Some of the features of Resonance can be implemented using today’s protocols.
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VMPS [26] allows a network to map a host to its corresponding VLAN based on
its MAC address. However, network operators achieve this mapping via manual
configuration; if a host needs to be re-mapped based on a change in its state (e.g.,
if the host becomes compromised), VMPS provides no mechanism for automatically
remapping such a host; this remapping must either be done manually, or a higher-
layer, on-path security middlebox must take appropriate action. Resonance’s access
control is both more dynamic and more fine-grained than the access control enabled
by VMPS and VLANs.
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CHAPTER III
RESONANCE: DESIGN AND USE CASES
Access control is a well-known paradigm for enforcing and implementing network
security in campus and enterprise networks. In this chapter, we describe the design
of Resonance and explain how it overcomes issues in current architecture. Resonance
is based on a formal state machine access control model. We modified the formal
model to simplify our design and make it more applicable to the problem at hand.
We, then, present some of the use cases of Resonance, including admission control
and rate limiting.
3.1 Overview
Resonance is a state-machine based access control framework which can solve wide
variety of problems. Resonance works by specifying a state machine to represent
network dynamics and associating each state with a set of access control policies.
Resonance works as follows:
1. Associate hosts with generic states and security classes.
2. Devise a state machine to capture network dynamics of hosts. In other words,
the state machine should express changes in network policies over time based
on events.
3. Install or modify forwarding state in switches based on the state of the host and
related policies.
Next, we present a formal state machine model which can be used to prove security
properties of a system. Resonance is based on a similar model, but with a few major
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differences.
3.2 Formal State Machine Model for Access Control
Computation as a state machine model was first presented by D. E. Bell and L.J.
LaPadula in 1976 [2]. The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is more generic than just an
access control model; information flow can also be modeled using the BLP model. This
model has been instrumental in building secure systems esp. where the model needs
to be verifiable. The BLP model is abstract without any specifics of what subjects,
objects, access rights, etc. mean in the real world. We architected Resonance by
redefining states, subjects, objects and other entities in the context of network access
control. Because of its closeness to express end applications, the BLP model is a
good fit for our problem, even though real applications don’t necessitate the need for
mathematically sound model. In fact, a formal base serves as an additional feature
of our design.
The finite-state machine model views a computer system as a finite set of states,
together with a transition function to determine what the next state will be, based
on the current state and the current value of the input. The transition function may
also determine an output value. Transitions are viewed as occurring instantaneously
in this model; therefore certain potential information channels (e.g., those related to
observing the time spent in a certain state) in real systems tend to be hidden by it.
The state machine model represents the system in terms of the triple (S, I, F ),
where S is a set of states, I is a set of possible inputs, and F is the transition function
to move the system from one state to another. Security properties are proved using
induction. Typically, assuming the initial state is secure, proving that each of the
transitions lead to a secure state, the security of the entire system is guaranteed.




• A access modes such as read(r) and write(w)
• L security levels
In the context of networks, subjects could represent hosts, objects could be net-
work services and access models could be simple allow or deny rules.
System, states, and state transitions. A system can be thought of as an
instantiation of a state machine with states V. Each state v is a member of the set of
all possible states V = (B×F ), where:
• B is the set of all possible current access sets. An element b of the current
access set is a triple (s, o, a) - subject, object, access mode. It represents the
accesses that are currently held by the subjects on the objects.
• F is a subset of LS×LO. Each element of F is a pair of functions (fS, fO), which
gives the security level associated with each subject and each object. This can
be used to deduce relative security properties of subjects and objects, and the
state as a whole.
A state transition is defined in terms of an action tuple (r, d, v∗, v). Here, r is
an element of the set of requests R, and d is an element of the set of Decisions, D. A
rule in the state transition is a function that associates (request, state) with a pair
(decision, state). Essentially, rules correspond to system operations such as get-read
(which alters the current access set), give-access {which alters the access matrix},
etc. The action tuple represents a transition from state v to v∗ on request r resulting
in decision d. The inputs to the system are a set of requests R, and the outputs are
decisions D.
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Security Properties. A secure state is defined by three important proper-
ties that are intended to express policies: the simple security (ss-) property, the *-
property, and the discretionary security property. The ss-property expresses clearance-
classification policy. The *-property represents the policy of no unauthorized flow
of information from a higher level to a lower one. These two properties represent
mandatory access control. The discretionary security property reflects the principle
of authorization and is expressed in an access matrix.
A state satisfies the ss-property if and only if, for each element of the current access
set b, the security level of the subject dominates the security level of the object. The
*-property is satisfied if and only if (1) for each write access in the current access set
b, the level of the object equals the current level of the subject, and (2) for each read
access in b, the level of the subject dominates the level of the object. The *-property
ensures that, if a subject has read access to one object and write access to another,
then the level of the first is dominated by the level of the second.
Informally, a system is defined as all sequences of actions with some initial state
that satisfy a relation (represented by the set of possible action tuples) on the suc-
cessive states. A state sequence z is secure if and only if each state in the sequence
is secure. An element (x, y, z ) is called an appearance of the system, where x is a
request sequence, y is decision sequence and z is a state sequence. An appearance is
a secure appearance if and only if z is a secure sequence. Finally, a system is secure
if and only if z is a secure sequence.
3.3 State machine based policy specification
To model real-time network applications, we investigated some of the underlying prop-
erties of a typical enterprise network. We observe that hosts are exposed to different
kinds of traffic. Everyday, we see viruses, spam, malware, botnets appear. Hosts
need to be constantly patched with new updates. Clearly, Enterprise networks are
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driven by events resulting in constantly changing network state; hosts can become
compromised, remain unauthenticated, be run by priority users for research experi-
ments, open new network ports, users can come and go, links can go up and down. If
we view the network as consisting of different elements and devices that dynamically
change their behavior depending on network inputs, a state-machine based design for
Resonance becomes natural.
Resonance has been designed in a different way than BLP to allow it to better
describe existing systems. One appeal of BLP model is its abstractness, but the same
quality makes it difficult to apply. It has no place for application-dependent security
rules. The BLP model defines states as abstract relation “currently held” between
subjects, objects and access methods. However, in case of network access control,
having each flow represent a new state is overly restrictive and would explode the
state address space. Thus, for Resonance, we define a state as representing in essence
only the security levels of the subjects. Using this abstraction, we can actually define
each state to be just a set of access control policies stating what network services
are accessible to hosts. We also define subjects as being network hosts, objects being
network services and access modes being whether or not the network service are
allowed for those hosts. In the BLP model, the entire system is represented using
a single state machine and related transitions. However, for Resonance, each host
belongs to its own state, though still following the same state machine as other hosts
in the network. The controller keeps track of the states of all the hosts in the network.
As with the BLP model, we can argue about the security properties of the system by
observing that a system is secure if all the transitions of hosts result in secure states.
In order to specify the state machine, we first identify the states. For example,
in case of the admission control problem, a host can belong to one of several states.
A host can be a new host which needs to authenticate. It can also be compromised
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in which case, it has to be quarantined. On receiving inputs from network, the con-
troller changes a host’s state. In Resonance, a state represents a set of access control
policy, allowing or disallowing specific traffic. Clearly, state machine is application
dependent. We shall apply the Resonance technique to different use cases.
As with any other method, the design of Resonance can be best understood by
considering different use cases and examples. In the next few sections, we discuss two
different use cases for Resonance. As a first use case, we apply our state-machine
model to the network admission control problem at the Georgia Tech Campus. In
the second use case, we study how Resonance can be used to dynamically change rate
limiting policies.
3.4 Network Admission Control: Redesigning START
Network Admission Control refers to the problem of filtering hosts which are allowed
access to the network services. Users start by connecting their device to the network.
Typically, they are presented with a web site to enter their authentication credentials.
During this time, the network device is denied access to any traffic other than the
web traffic. Once users verify their login information, they can continue surfing the
Internet normally. This is a simplistic model of Network Admission Control problem
we have described so far. As we introduce new network elements, e.g. firewalls, secu-
rity middle-boxes etc., network policies might become complicated. As an instance,
to keep network free from botnets and viruses, a network scanner can be added to the
network to monitor botnet activities. Implementing policies which can isolate hosts,
discovered as being part of a botnet by the monitor, on the fly can be tricky.
START is the technology currently used in Georgia Tech dormitories to tackle this
problem. It allows users to connect their machine to the Georgia Tech network. The
users are then presented with a captive web portal. After authenticating with their
credentials and a basic machine scan, the users get access to the Internet. As discussed
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in Section 2.1.2, START suffers from VLAN management issues and lack of continuous
network monitoring. Resonance tries to overcome these problems by mapping this
problem to a state machine model. We examine some of the inherent properties in
the START system and infer states directly from the way START architecture works.
3.4.1 State Description
Based on the intrinsic nature of ”Network Admission Control” problem and the
START design, we have identified the following 4 states:
1. Registration. In this state, the user is not allowed access to any network ser-
vice. All web traffic is redirected to the web portal, where the user is presented
with a web site. From this state, a user can move to Registration state once the
authentication succeeds.
2. Scan. In START, after the user authenticates, it has to be scanned for potential
vulnerabilities. We introduce Scan state that corresponds to the machine being
scanned. The host is allowed access to only updates sites, e.g. Microsoft update
websites. The hosts can get the required patches before they connect to the
Internet. This state can lead to either Quarantined state or Operation state.
3. Operation. In this state, users are allowed full access to the Internet.
4. Quarantined. Hosts belonging to this state are denied access to all network
traffic. The host OS needs to be reinstalled or the infection manually removed
before the host can be moved back to the registration state.
The entire set of policies governing each state is shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
The “Actions” column corresponds to OpenFlow commands to be executed when
the switch encounters packets which match the corresponding “Match” column. For
example, in “Registration” state, all packets matching “ARP” (Ethernet frame type
0x806) are flooded on output ports by the switch.
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Table 2: Flow table entries for Registration and Operation states.
Registration State
Match Action
Ethernet Type ARP (0x806) FLOOD
UDP src port=68
dst port=67 (for DHCP)
FLOOD
UDP src port=67
dst port=68 (for DHCP)
FLOOD
UDP src port=53
dst port=* (for DNS)
FLOOD
UDP src port=*
dst port=53 (for DNS)
FLOOD
TCP Dst port 80/443/8080







cording to policy lookup)
3.4.2 State Transitions
Figure 4 shows all the state transitions for Resonance as applied to START.
We summarize the transitions as follows:
• Registration State Transitions. Transitions are possible to Scan state and
Quarantined state. Registration state to Scan state transition happens on receiv-
ing input from web portal. Transition to Quarantined state occurs after a user
incorrectly authenticates for maximum allowed times.
• Scan State Transitions. If the scan on the host was clean and the patches
successfully applied, then the host can transition from Scan state to Operation
state, else the host is moved to Quarantined state.
1Note that REDIRECT is not an actual command specified in OpenFlow spec. We use it to
denote a set of flow entries which direct traffic to the appropriate host.
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Table 3: Flow table entries for Scan and Quarantined states.
Scan State
Match Action
Ethernet Type ARP (0x806) FLOOD
Dst IP=(Scanner’s IP) FORWARD
Src IP=(Scanner’s IP) FORWARD
TCP dst IP=update sites FORWARD
TCP src IP=update sites FORWARD
UDP dst port=53 (DNS
port)
FORWARD










• Operation State Transitions. On getting input from the distributed IDS, a
host can be moved back to the Scan state.
• Quarantined State Transitions. The controller can get input from the net-
work administrator to allow the host to move back to the Registration state.
3.4.3 Resonance Step-by-Step
In this section, we explain how Resonance works step-by-step when a host connects
to the network. We also describe how the controller manages the flow-table entries
when two hosts attempt to communicate. Finally, we explain how a machine changes
states and how the controller changes the flow-table entries accordingly.
Let us consider a simple setup with four OpenFlow switches, one controller, two
hosts, and four servers, as shown in Figure 5. When OpenFlow switches establish a
connection with the controller using a secure channel, the controller installs default
flow rules for DNS, DHCP and ARP traffic with FLOOD action as indicated in
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Figure 4: State transitions for a host. The controller tracks the state of each host
and updates the current state according to inputs from external sources (e.g., network
monitors).
Table 2. When a new host is introduced on the network, it first broadcasts a DHCP
discover message. Since the switches have already been configured to allow all DHCP
to be flooded, the host is able to acquire a network IP address following the standard
DHCP protocol. The controller also adds the host to its database of hosts and marks
its state as “Registration”. Quarantined hosts may still be able to reach the Internet
by tunneling traffic over DNS. We are working on solutions that can avoid such
communication.
In the Registration state, if a host initiates any traffic that is not DHCP or ARP,
the controller installs a new flow-table entry into the switch with action=“DROP”,
unless the traffic is HTTP, in which case the controller installs an entry to redirect
traffic to the portal, which redirects the user to the authentication Web site. A
machine in the Registration or Quarantined state cannot initiate a connection, but
it can always receive packets from a machine in the Operation state. We make this
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Figure 5: Applying Resonance to START.
policy rule for simplicity.2
The Web portal allows the user to authenticate and notifies the controller of the
status of the authentication via a separate connection. Upon successful authentica-
tion, the controller moves the host to Scan or Quarantined state. It then deletes all old
flow-table entries corresponding to the host’s MAC address and installs a new set of
flow-table entries, as shown in Table 3. The only change made from Registration state
to Scan state is that the host can communicate with the scanner and update sites.
The scanner scans the machine for potential vulnerabilities. If the machine is found to
be vulnerable, it is redirected to update sites to patch those vulnerabilities. Once the
update patches have been applied, the scanner notifies the controller, which transfers
the host to the Operation state and updates the flow-table entries accordingly.
Once in the Operation state, the host can connect to any other Internet destination.
2An immediate implication is that communication is possible from Operation state machines to
quarantined host machines. Because quarantined machines cannot initiate external communication,
they are relatively immune to threats.
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Figure 6: Flow chart representing sequence of actions in Resonance when applied
to START.
During normal operation, a host may become compromised. If network alarms inform
the controller about the event, the controller can then shift the host to the Scan state.
Figure 6 shows a flowchart representing this entire procedure.
3.5 Dynamic Rate Limiting
Rate limiting is used to control the rate of traffic sent or received by hosts. Traffic
that is less than or equal to the specified rate is sent, whereas traffic that exceeds
the rate is dropped or delayed. Rate limiting is typically performed by policing
(discarding excess packets), queuing (delaying packets in transit) or congestion control
(manipulating the protocol’s congestion mechanism). Policing and queuing can be
applied to any network protocol. These can even be implemented in a Linux box
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using simple iptables rules. Congestion control can only be applied to protocols with
congestion control mechanisms, such as the transmission control protocol (TCP).
Resonance’s state-machine based design can perform dynamic rate limiting by
allowing traffic to flow through different rate limiters on the fly.
State Description. Enterprise business models characterize how different class
of users and/or accounts should be allocated bandwidths. Other than using account
information, we can also use time of day to restrict volume of traffic flow during
peak times. Using this as the base, defining a state is as simple as categorizing the
bandwidth allocations at specific time of day and the account type. In our example,
we have defined four states corresponding to four possible combinations of the tuple
〈A, T〉, where A is the account type and T is the time of day.
Figure 7: State transitions for dynamic rate limiting.
Inputs. There are two kinds of inputs allowed: R, request for account change and
D, the current time of day. Accounts are either guest or premium. Premium account
users get a higher share of bandwidth as compared to guest account users. Thus, R
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contains two values, g and p. Information about account upgrades can be sent to the
controller in the same way as for other inputs. Time of day can be divided into peak
time and non-peak times. In general, high volume of traffic is observed around late
afternoon and at other times of day network traffic is low. D contains the values p
and n, for peak and non-peak traffic times.
State Transition Function. Figure 7 shows a simple transition function depict-
ing how a flexible rate limiting policy can be implemented in Resonance.
There are transitions of two types, based on the input type. For account upgrades,
the state is moved to high bandwidth. Similarly, the controller moves a host to a high






We have implemented Resonance over NOX, a platform for creating new controller
components. NOX provides basic interface to send and receive messages from the
switches, and allows developers to create new components for interacting with the
switch. Our current development uses NOX version 0.5.0 and OpenFlow version 0.8.9.
In this section, we briefly outline machine configurations and setup, the organization
of the Resonance code, discuss component interactions, show how we bootstrapped
our initial setup, and give an overview of low-level interactions between Resonance
and OpenFlow switches.
Network elements and configurations. All server machines are Dell Pow-
erEdge 1900 machines running Ubuntu Linux 9.04 with 8GB RAM and Intel(R)
Xeon(R) Quadcore 2.5GHz processors. There are six 1Gbps network interfaces at-
tached to each of them. The Web portal currently runs Apache version 2.2.11 and
PHP version 5.2.6. Configuring the web portal and making redirection to work re-
quired considerable effort. Our initial attempts at DNAT-based redirection using
iptables [16] on promiscuous interface failed. Later, we found that iptables doesn’t
work directly on promiscuous mode. To solve this problem, we created a bridge and
connected the physical interface to the bridge. The bridge allowed all packets to be
captured and sent to iptables for DNAT processing. For IP address allocation and
DNS, we have installed a unified cache-DNS and DHCP server using dnsmasq [6].
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Base Resonance code. Most of the Resonance code is written in C++. The
controller maintains a mapping between host machines and their corresponding ports
on a particular datapath, which can be thought of as a learning switch. Each datapath
represents a new connection from the switch to the host. When a host requests a new
flow, the controller checks which state the host belongs to. If it is a new host, it
adds its MAC address to the state machine list and marks its state as being in the
Registration state. Thus, the controller maintains two mappings, one for maintaining
the state machine and the other to find out which port the packet for that machine
should be forwarded to.
For receiving inputs from external network elements, a separate communication
path must exist. In Resonance, all external communication is handled through a
separate component called Messenger. Messenger is a TCP server implemented as a
separate component in NOX. It listens on TCP port 9999 and spawns a new thread for
every new communication request it receives. Then, it forwards the received message
to the Resonance component. In NOX, message passing between components is done
through post() API. The received message from external communication is passed
to the Resonance component using Msg event structure in post(). We register a
Msg event handler in the Resonance component which handles messages received from
the messenger. The event handler then updates the states of the host depending on the
input from the web portal, scanner and the network monitors. Messenger-Resonance
interactions are shown in Figure 8.
Bootstrapping. This refers to the procedure and configurations involved in boot-
ing up our setup after all physical connections are done. For this, we assume that
all the switches know about the controller beforehand. There are discovery com-
ponents already available in NOX, which can be used to do bootstrapping. In our
implementation, we have manually configured the OpenFlow switches through CLI
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Figure 8: Event handling and message passing between Resonance and Messenger
components.
(command-line interface) to connect to the controller using a hardcoded IP address
and port number. We also assume that all the switches as well as the web portal, the
scanner, and the network monitors are trusted. Just like the discovery component,
authenticator components are already available in NOX to handle authentication for
trusted devices.
When the switches initiate a connection to the controller, the controller immedi-
ately installs default wildcard flow rules for DHCP, DNS, and ARP. In our current
implementation, we flood DHCP, DNS, and ARP requests over the entire network.
All flow table entries, other than DHCP, DNS, and ARP are exact match entries
and are handled as and when new flows arrive. For example, for a host in Quaran-
tine state, the first packet for any new network session will be sent to the controller.
Knowing that the host is quarantined, the controller sends a flow table entry to the
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switch to drop subsequent packets for that flow.
A minor implementation question could be: Why not set all flow policies for a
particular state in the switch beforehand instead of doing it on-demand? It is possible
to do so using wildcard feature available in OpenFlow switches. But, these rules need
to be on a per host basis, resulting in flow table size being equal to the number of hosts
in that state. Currently, number of wildcard entries are restricted to around 100 in
most of today’s switches (because of hardware limitations of TCAMs), which makes
this approach infeasible. In addition, wildcard matching is handled in software which
can lead to significant performance hits. From the experiments we have performed,
we see that the maximum number of flows come from DNS, DHCP and ARP requests.
So, we use wildcard entries for such flows instead, since querying the controller for
such flows can overload the controller and incur delay penalties.
Operation. Whenever the controller receives updates from the Web portal and
other devices, it must change the state of the corresponding host. It does so by
deleting all the current flow table entries for that host by sending an OpenFlow
message with the OFPFC DELETE command and moving the host from one state
to the other depending on the input received. Individual flows are setup as and
when they are received by the controller. Because all flow-table entries are deleted
whenever there is a state change for a host, when the host tries to establish a new
flow, a new message is sent from the switch to the controller. The controller then
takes appropriate action, either allowing (using FORWARD command) or blocking
(no action field in OF message) flow, depending on the current state of the host.
4.2 Deployment
The campus network currently supported by START was recently upgraded to include
approximately 275 switches that are capable of supporting the OpenFlow firmware.
One of the more significant practical challenges in the campus deployment will be
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straining the scalability of the system on a production network without disrupting
connectivity. For example, the proposed architecture may involve installing many
flow table entries in the switches, which may either exhaust memory or slow lookup
performance if entries are not stored efficiently, or if state is not offloaded to the
controller. To address this concern, we will first stress-test the design on the research
testbed and subsequently the architecture on a smaller number of production switches
before completely rolling out the architecture.
We have successfully been able to deploy Resonance in three buildings at Georgia
Tech Campus. Figure 9 shows the current status of our deployment. The deploy-
ment is a dedicated network that is physically separate from the production network
and yet has its own IP prefix and upstream connectivity. This platform allows us to
develop and test Resonance before deploying it on the production network. We have
both wireless and wired connectivity on the testbed. Our current setup spans three
buildings at Georgia Tech: Technology Square Research Building (TSRB), Klaus Ad-
vanced Computing Building (KACB) and College of Computing Building (CCB). We
have OpenFlow-enabled 48×1G switches from three different vendors: NEC, Toroki,
and HP. Switches from Toroki are LB4G Quanta models with OpenFlow firmware ver-
sion 0.8.9. NEC and HP switches both have 0.8.9 versions of the OpenFlow firmware.
There is an access point in the networking lab to support wireless communication. As
of now, the IP address space is taken from BGP-Mux setup [9]. We plan to expand
our IP space using the already allocated IP address space from RNOC.
4.2.1 Connectivity and Setup
All buildings are connected to each other using the NEC switch in CCB. Fiber paths
connect both TSRB and KACB directly to CCB. Currently, all users connect to the
Resonance network through the KACB building. In KACB, the OpenFlow-enabled
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Figure 9: Current research testbed with connectivities between three campus build-
ings.
Quanta switch is present in the data closet in the third floor. There are two connec-
tions coming out of the switch; one to the NEC switch and the other to the controller,
both in CCB. Other ports on the Quanta switch are directly patched to ports in the
networking lab. These ports in networking lab serve as entry points to the Resonance
network. A wireless access point is connected to one of them and facilitates wireless
connection in the lab.
Since the Quanta switches only support out-of-band configuration, we need a sep-
arate control path to the controller from the switch. For this purpose, a separate
virtual LAN (VLAN) has been assigned from KACB to CCB, and from TSRB to
CCB. Controller in CCB and Quanta switches in KACB and TSRB are part of this
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VLAN. All control traffic including initial OpenFlow handshakes between the switches
and controller take place over this VLAN. Although out-of-band configuration allows
better segregation of control and data traffic, yet for actual deployments such a con-
figuration becomes infeasible since it necessitates the existence of separate VLAN
paths from all switches in the entire network to the controller. On the CCB side,
we have placed all management machines, including Web Portal machine, Controller
machine and the DHCP/DNS server machine in the CCB machine room. All these
management devices are connected directly to NEC switch in same rack. Connec-
tivity with TSRB is still not fully functional. We have HP and Quanta switches in
TSRB which are yet to be connected to controller in CCB. The RNOC switch, the
gateway to the Internet for RNOC IP subnet, is also situated in TSRB, is waiting to
be put online on the Resonance network.
Accessing the Resonance network. Users can directly log in to the Resonance
network using WEP key for the access point located in the networking lab. On
accessing Web, the users will be directed to the Web Portal where they have to
authenticate using a hardcoded username and password. At this stage, the users
get access to the Internet. We plan to introduce a IPS/IDS detection device and a
scanner on this test network. The controller can use inputs from these middleboxes
to complete all the state machine transitions.
A small working version of the Resonance system was demonstrated at the GENI
Engineering Conference (GEC7) [10]. We explain the demonstration setup, along
with screenshots in more detail in Appendix A. While being used for testing and
developing Resonance, existing infrastructure can also be leveraged by other research
projects for their own deployment, which can run side-by-side. This can be made
possible by using FlowVisor [1] on top of NOX. FlowVisor provides the ability to
direct different control traffic to different controllers.
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4.3 Preliminary Evaluation
Performance and scalability of Resonance are as important as its functionality itself.
In this section, we tackle the issue of whether Resonance is scalable enough to handle
an enterprise network and has a reasonable performance to be in use. We evaluate
two aspects of Resonance. First, we investigate scalability of Resonance in terms
of whether it can handle the bulk of traffic generated by the network. The number
of entries in the flow table of OpenFlow-enabled switches should never cross the
hardware limit. Second, Resonance should not introduce unacceptable delay.
First, we must be aware of OpenFlow-enabled switch’s capability. According to
the specification, OpenFlow software switch can support 131,072 exact match entries
and 100 wildcard entries. There are several OpenFlow-enabled switches manufactured
by vendors including Toroki and NEC which currently provide around 1500 entries in
the flow-table. We expect a product to come out with more capabilities in the future.
To simulate traffic that is similar to the real world, we captured traces from the
Georgia Tech campus network. Georgia Tech maintains a network which represents
a typical network infrastructure that many campuses and enterprise networks imple-
ment.
4.3.1 Flow table size analysis
We assume a single switch will roughly handle a /16 subnet. Here, we focus on two
different /16 subnets, A and B. An hour of sample traffic is captured on a server
listening to a certain part of the campus network on a typical weekday from 2pm to
3pm. It is then classified based on source and destination IP address matching to
a certain /16 subnet. Each traffic is analyzed to extract the number of concurrent
unique flows in a specific time interval. With this information, We measure how many
flow-table entries are needed to manage the traffic, and whether an OpenFlow switch
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Figure 10: Number of concurrent flows in subnet A.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the number of unique flows in a given 5 minute
interval along an hour. Each unique flow will map to a single flow-table entry in a
switch. This can be used to predict how many flow-table entries are required to handle
the network traffic managed by the subnet. As shown in both subnets, the number is
mostly below the 131,072 threshold. In addition, there will be multiple flows which
can be dealt with several wildcard entries. If optimized by using wildcard entries
effectively, the numbers can be decreased further. Better timeout values for each entry
based on their protocol and service will help as well. The graph promises that in a
typical campus network, Resonance is scalable in terms of flow-table entries generated
in each switch. As OpenFlow switches will only be deployed at the edge network, the
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Figure 11: Number of concurrent flows in subnet B.
size and number of hosts.
4.3.2 Flow setup and performance experiments
Resonance should not impose noticeable delay in the network itself. In this section,
we show the evaluation result of Resonance in terms of flow setup time and packet
transfer delay.
In OpenFlow framework, there is a delay introduced by consulting the central
controller. The controller is responsible of sending a response and installing flow
table entries in the requesting switch. Flow setup time is the delay caused by setting
up an entry in the switch’s flow table. In other words, flow setup time is the difference
between the time a switch sent a request to the controller, and the time it received a

















Flow setup time (milliseconds)
Flow setup time of Resonance
Resonance
Figure 12: Flow setup time delay using Resonance.
the flow setup delay is an issue. The delay caused by Resonance decision making
process should be in a tolerable boundary. To measure this delay, OpenFlow-related
traffic is collected at the switch, and analyzed according to the OpenFlow protocol
to find the request and response packet. Then, the time difference is calculated to
measure the flow setup time using the timestamp value from these packets.
Figure 12 shows the CDF of the time spent on flow setup. The graph shows that
the flow setup delay is mostly below 6 milliseconds, where the majority is between 3
to 6 ms. This is a negligible amount of time compared to other delays caused by the
network itself. In addition, this delay only occurs at the first time the flow table entry
is inserted. There will be no further delay when incoming flows matches an entry in


















Ping Delay in Resonance
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Figure 13: Ping delay in Resonance.
A straightforward way to evaluate the performance of Resonance is to measure a
ping delay. Figure 13 shows the delay in Resonance compared to the existing net-
work. As Resonance has much more functionality implemented within it, more delay
is an expected behavior. The difference between production and Resonance is around
40 ms. One of the reasons of this additional delay is that these experiments were
performed on Linux kernel reference implementation switches. OpenFlow software
switches are installed in a normal Unbuntu Linux box, and it is bound to be slower
than normal hardware switches because traffic has to be processed up to the applica-
tion layer, traversing the entire network stack for processing. If an OpenFlow-enabled











































Figure 14: Secure copy delay in Resonance.
layer, the difference is expected to be much less. The flow setup delay will not con-
tribute much to the ping delay, as it only has influence at the first time the flow enters
the switch. Another reason can be the delay caused by searching the flow table for
a match. However, this will be insignificant, as OpenFlow uses an effective hashing
algorithm to perform this task.
In addition to the delay in ICMP, measuring the delay with an application using
TCP will be more realistic. Therefore, we measured delay when using secure copy.
The files being transfered range from 1 MB to 1 GB. As shown in Figure 14, there
is no noticeable delay using Resonance compared to the production network in the
scale of seconds. The difference will be more apparent as the file size increases, but
it was not significant up to 1 GB.
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4.4 Challenges
Despite the promise of Resonance’s design and recent technology trends that could
make its deployment more feasible, we continue to grapple with many challenges in
our test deployment.
• Scale When deploying the architecture on the campus network, we expect to
encounter numerous challenges involving scalability. For example, the Georgia
Tech residential network must support approximately 16,000 users; the portion
of the campus that runs START comprises more than 13,000 network ports, and
future plans include expanding START to more than 40,000 active ports across
academic buildings and merging START with the (separate) access control sys-
tem currently used for the campus wireless network. A significant challenge will
be implementing dynamic, fine-grained policies with flow-table entries, without
exhausting switch memory or slowing forwarding. Though our initial investiga-
tions in Section 4.3 show positive signs about the scalability of Resonance, yet
we believe that as we carry out our deployment efforts more aggressively, we
shall encounter unforeseen hurdles in terms of traffic handling and flow capacity
limits on switches and controller. To cope with these issues, we can definitely
segregate different parts of the network, handling only a subset of hosts based
on the hash value of their MAC addresses. The underlying mechanism behind
Resonance permits several controllers to co-exist without the need for much
co-ordination between them. FlowVisor can also be used to slice different net-
work subnets to reduce the burden of traffic handled by the controller. Recent
proposals for optimizing customizable forwarding [4] may offer a useful starting
point too.
• Responsiveness End hosts and network devices must be able to quickly au-
thenticate to the network controller; similarly, the network must be able to
42
quickly quarantine a compromised host and curtail unwanted traffic. The cur-
rent design is inadequate in this regard, as it has a single VLAN for quaran-
tined hosts and requires hosts to re-boot to reassign hosts from one VLAN to
another. The Resonance architecture offers more fine-grained, dynamic control
over hosts’ traffic, but the control framework between the switches and con-
troller must still be able to map hosts from one part of the network to another
as quickly as possible. To enable this responsiveness, distributed inference must
be fast, and the controller must be able to quickly and reliably alter the behavior
of the switches themselves.
• Integration with monitoring The current START network access control
system scans hosts when they are first introduced into the network but cannot
re-assign these hosts to different networks when they are deemed to be com-
promised. In our ongoing work, we already have a setup in place that can
leverage today’s state-of-the-art IPS/IDS systems to classify and quarantine
compromised hosts.
• Securing the control framework The effectiveness of Resonance depends
on the existence of a secure, reliable channel between the controller and the
switches. The control messages between the controller and the switches must be
authenticated (so that switches do not alter their behavior based on arbitrary
control messages), and the channel must remain reliable and available, even




Existing enterprise networks leave network monitoring and access control to higher
layers (e.g., DHCP, application-level intrusion detection, etc.) and place considerable
amounts of trust and responsibility into the network devices themselves, resulting in
complex, error-prone configurations for enforcing security policies. To remedy these
ills, network access control must be more dynamic and fine-grained, and it must make
as few assumptions as possible about the behavior of the host. We have introduced
a new framework, Resonance, for specifying dynamic access control policies for net-
works, described how this might be implemented in an OpenFlow-based architecture,
and shown how to apply Resonance in the context of the Georgia Tech’s network
access control framework. In addition to the test and operational deployments them-
selves, we are exploring how Resonance can support more complex access control
policies.
Future Work. As next steps, we plan to aggressively pursue our deployment
efforts to include more switches, buildings and hosts. Challenges continue to shape
Resonance’s design and development. We have addressed some of them in this thesis.
We continue to invest our efforts towards making our system scalable and robust,
giving near-production performance, and making it free of security threats. As of now,
our wireless infrastructure makes use of OpenFlow switches as a back-end. OpenFlow-
enabled access points would add more diversity to our testbed. We also plan on adding
better front-end to monitor traffic, troubleshoot issues and simplify usage. We are
exploring further avenues for Resonance’s application and use cases, e.g. QoS, load
balancing, IP/Interactive TV provisioning, etc. Our end-goal is to replace existing
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security solutions in Enterprise networks with Resonance, making network security




Figure 15: GEC7 Demo setup.
At the 7th GENI Engineering Conference (GEC7) [10], March 16, 2010, we demon-
strated a working version of Resonance. The setup is shown in Figure 15. We had
two switches connected to the controller. One of the switches was a Quanta switch
in KACB, and the other one was a Kernel switch installed on a Linux box in CCB.
Fiber path ensured direct connectivity between the two switches. As with our current
deployment, control traffic was exchanged over a VLAN. To fully mimic an existing
system, DHCP/DNS servers and web authentication portal are also part of the in-
frastructure. Having a live remote demo for our existing setup was tricky. We had to
invoke a VM session inside VNC. As we see in the screenshots, there are two windows
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Figure 16: Resonance login page.
open. The window to left has a Windows XP VirtualBox guest VM running inside
VNC. This VM’s network interface is directly wired to a Resonance port and is totally
isolated from the host network. The right window is a GUI front-end to NOX, called
Envi [7]. We made custom modifications to the Envi code to enable flow visualization
and other features.
The screenshots show three different stages of user authentication. Figure 16 is
the main Resonance login page. A user gets redirected to this website on access-
ing any url (in this case, http://www.google.com). On right window, we see the
corresponding traffic flow. There are two kinds of traffic flowing in the network.
There is ARP traffic to the gateway (shown as a cloud). The other flow is the
actual web traffic exchange between the host and the authentication portal. The
red color on the host icon indicates that the host is in Registration state and is not
authenticated. In the next step, the user successfully authenticates as depicted in
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Figure 17: Successful login.
Figure 17. Note that the color of the host icon has now changed to green indicating
that the login was successful. Finally, the user is redirected to the original Google
website, after 3 seconds (Figure 18). Accordingly, the GUI window shows flow going
only to the gateway. A video clip of Resonance showing all the steps is available at
“http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gGeb1SEwgM”.
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